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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-2961

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
STOKELY ROSE,
Appellant

On Appeal from a Final Judgment of Conviction and Sentence of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Criminal No. 00-14)
District Judge: Hon. Robert B. Kugler

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, and MICHEL*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 19, 2006)

OPINION
MICHEL, Circuit Judge.
*

Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by
designation.

On December 30, 1999, Stokely Rose, a Jamaican national and United States
temporary resident, was arrested for brokering a deal in which he provided one kilogram
of cocaine to a confidential informant, who then “sold” the drugs to an undercover officer
in Philadelphia. Rose was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, conspiracy to distribute
more than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. This was Rose’s first
criminal offense, placing him in criminal history category I. Because he accepted
responsibility for his behavior and agreed to plead guilty, he was granted a three-level
reduction in offense level, to offense level 23. With a criminal history category of I and
offense level of 23, the sentencing guideline range was 46-57 months. However, a drug
offense involving more than 500 grams of cocaine has a statutory minimum sentence of
60 months, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), and, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), a
“statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence” if the statutory
minimum exceeds the upper end of the guideline range. Accordingly, the guideline
sentence for Rose’s drug offense was 60 months.
Based on a government motion, the district judge departed downwardly from the
guideline sentence based on Rose’s substantial assistance to the government, and
sentenced Rose to 33 months imprisonment and five years supervised release. Upon
completion of his custodial term on May 22, 2002, Rose was released to an INS detainer
and was deported to Jamaica one month later.
On December 30, 2003, Rose attempted illegally to reenter the United States at
Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta. Rose presented to the United States
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Immigration Inspector an altered Canadian citizenship card with a false name. He was
referred for a secondary inspection, where he was fingerprinted and correctly identified as
Stokely Rose, and was then arrested and charged. Rose pled guilty to illegal reentry after
deportation and, on June 9, 2004, Rose was sentenced in the Northern District of Georgia
to 46 months incarceration and three years supervised release.
Because Rose had been convicted on his plea of guilty to illegal reentry after
deportation, a Grade B violation of supervised release, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 (classifying
supervised release violations), the advisory sentencing guideline range for Revocation of
Supervised Release was 4-10 months imprisonment, with a statutory maximum of 36
months. At a hearing in New Jersey federal district court on June 3, 2005, Rose pled
guilty to a violation of supervised release.
Rose testified that he returned to the United States solely to visit his wife’s grave
outside Philadelphia. In 2001, while Mr. Rose had been imprisoned on the drug charge,
his wife was found murdered in the basement of their Philadelphia home. Prison officials
denied Rose’s and Rose’s in-laws’ requests that he be permitted to attend his wife’s
funeral. As such, Rose maintained that he had been denied the opportunity to pay his last
respects to his wife.
However, Rose’s testimony was not corroborated by his travel documents or the
testimony of his late wife’s parents. His travel itinerary indicated that, after a one-week
layover in Atlanta, Rose was scheduled to fly to Toronto, Canada. His late wife’s parents
testified that Rose had not told them of his travel plans, and his wife’s mother testified
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that Rose would be unable to find their daughter’s gravesite without assistance, because
“traffic wise it just seems like you’re going all over the place”. Rose testified that he flew
into Atlanta rather than Philadelphia because he feared that he would be recognized and
arrested in Philadelphia. Although Rose testified that a female friend was to drive him
from Atlanta to Philadelphia, that friend did not testify at the hearing, and Rose’s in-laws
testified that they did not recognize the friend’s name.
The district judge was unconvinced that Rose’s sole intention in reentering the
United States illegally was to visit his wife’s grave. The district judge explained that he
was departing upwardly from the recommended range for violation of supervised release
due to the substantial downward departure granted on Rose’s original drug conviction.
The district judge then sentenced Rose to 24 months imprisonment, to be served
consecutively, following his sentence for illegal reentry.
Rose appeals, arguing that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
implicitly lessened to “reasonable” the “plainly unreasonable” standard of review in 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4), applicable to sentences imposed for violations of supervised release,
and that the sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable. Because we affirm
the district court’s sentence under the less deferential standard of “reasonableness”, we
need not decide which standard of review applies to violations of supervised release, postBooker.
I
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). See
4

United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2006).
II
When a district court imposes a longer prison sentence in a Revocation of
Supervised Release proceeding, it must “consider” the now advisory sentencing range
under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), as well as “state on the record its general reasons under
section 3553(a) . . . for imposing a more stringent sentence.” United States v. Blackston,
940 F.2d 877, 894 (3d Cir. 1991).
On appeal, Rose argues that the 24-month term of imprisonment imposed by the
district court was unreasonable given the “unusual circumstances surrounding the
violation of supervised release” and the “substantial punishment imposed for the
underlying substantive illegal re-entry conviction”. We disagree. Rose received nearly a
fifty percent downward departure for his original drug offense, only a 33-month
imprisonment term from a guideline sentence of 60 months. The district court explicitly
cited this downward departure as the basis for its upward departure on the violation of
supervised release sentence. Moreover, the 24-month term imposed is easily within the
36-month statutory maximum.
The record shows that the district court fully considered Rose’s contention that he
attempted illegal reentry solely to visit his wife’s grave, and found his uncorroborated
testimony unpersuasive. The district judge stated that he was “not convinced at all” by
Rose’s explanation, and we afford deference to a district court’s findings on credibility.
United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 180 (3d Cir. 2002).
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We also reject Rose’s assertion that the length of the sentence imposed for the
underlying substantive illegal reentry conviction requires leniency on the violation of
supervised release sentence. Rose committed two separate crimes–illegal reentry and
violation of supervised release–and was sentenced for each. It was within the district
court’s discretion to order the sentence for violation of supervised release to be served
concurrent with or consecutive to the illegal reentry sentence. United States v. Swan, 275
F.3d 272, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2002). The district judge considered and rejected Rose’s
arguments for leniency, stating that “[t]here’s really no such thing as a free crime. I think
to treat this leniently would send the wrong message to people that have gotten a
tremendous break from the court originally that we have some sort of immunity or
impunity to this after violating the conditions of Supervised Release”.
Because the sentence imposed by the district court for violation of supervised
release was reasonable, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.
_____________________
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